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Recent Cases
CRIMINAL LAW-PROBATION AFTER PLEA OF NOT GUILTY
United States v. Wiley'
Defendant was convicted in the United States district court of possessing certain
stolen items. He appealed, raising the questions of sufficiency of the evidence and
of propriety of the district court's refusal to consider his application for probation
solely because he entered a plea of "not guilty." The probation statute provides
that upon entering a "judgment of conviction" any court having jurisdiction to
try the offense may grant probation.2 The court of appeals held that the words
"judgment of conviction" contemplate either 'judgment entered on a plea of
guilty or judgment entered on a verdict after trial on a plea of not guilty, and
that, while a court might take into consideration whether defendant had entered
a not guilty plea when he had only a frivolous defense, the court could not deny
probation solely because defendant had elected not to enter a guilty plea. After
affirming the conviction on the evidence, the court remanded the case to the
district court for consideration of defendant's application for probation.
One judge concurred in the affirmation of conviction on the evidence, but
dissented to the remanding of the case, on the basis that the district court had
received defendant's application for probation, but had acted unfavorably upon it.
The difference of opinion in the court is over a question of fact-did the district
court exercise its discretion-and a discussion of either the majority decision or
the dissent on this point would have little merit. If the district court did refuse
to consider the application for probation simply because defendant entered a plea
of not guilty, the upper court, because of the applicable statute, especially when
read in the light of its legislative history, 3 and for other reasons to be pointed
out presently, reached the proper result. On the other hand, if as the dissenting
judge maintains, the district court had received the application, but acted unfavorably upon it, the view expressed in the dissent is supported by ample authority,
which almost uniformly holds that probation rests in the sound discretion of the
court.4 The district court stated:
1. 267 F.2d 453 (7th Cir. 1959) (Hastings, J., dissenting).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1948).
3. The present statute isbased on Act of March 4,1923, ch. 521, § 2,43 Stat.
1259. The words "after conviction or after a plea of guilty or nolo contendere" were
omitted from the first sentence as unnecessary.
4. See, e.g., Birnbaum v.United States, 107 F.2d 885 (4th Cir. 1939); People
v.Good, 287 Mich. 110, 282 N.W.920 (1938); People v. Superior Court in and for
Imperial County, 208 Cal. 692, 284 Pac. 451 (1930); Rode v Baird, 196 Ind. 335,
144 N.E. 415 (1924); Petition of Gabis, 240 Mass. 465, 134 N.E. 267 (1922).
(195)
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'Had there been a plea of guilty in this case probably probation might have
been considered under certain terms, but you are all well aware of the
standing policy here that once a defendant stands trial that element of
grace is removed from the consideration of the Court in the imposition of
!5
sentence.'
Thus it appears that the majority opinion meets the problem squarely.
Regardless of the factual issue, the language of the court raises several significant questions: Can the attitude expressed be a representative policy, that is,
do other courts entertain such an attitude and apply such a policy where defendants
who plead "not guilty" are concerned; if so, what are the reasons given for, and
arguments against, the application of such a policy?
In answer to the first question, one author says, presumably with special
reference to, though not necessarily limited to, Missouri courts:
To the limitations on the powers of trial courts to grant probation imposed
by statute, many judges, particularly at circuit court level, have engrafted
an additional, almost inflexible, and certainly self-perpetuating doctrine:
No petitioner will be granted probation unless his conviction is the result
of a plea of guilty, rather than trial and verdict. So prevalent is this uinwritten ride that many consider it not only to have the force of law, but to
be the law. 6 (Emphasis added.)
There are few reported cases in which the exact problem has been presented, but
the infrequency of reported cases that deal with the question does not necessarily
prove that the attitude does not widely exist. 7 There appear to be only three

appellate decisions, in addition to the case under consideration, in which a lower
court's view has been that a defendant who pleads "not guilty" is not to be
considered for probation;$ all of these were reversed on appeal. On the other hand,
there are many cases in which the courts in dictum recognize in definitive language
that probation may be granted after either a plea of guilty or a finding of guilty.9
The reasons for refusing to consider probation after a plea of "not guilty"
are all closely related, and all unconvincing. These reasons seem to be based on a
feeling that probation is only for those who admit their guilt, and on a concern
for the public pocketbook, to the effect that the defendant has put the state to
the expense of a trial, and utilized the time of public prosecutors and the judge,
and is therefore entitled to no further consideration. Also, seemingly one writer
5. 267 F.2d at 455.
6. Kranitz, The Power of Judicial Parole, 14 J. Mo. B. 254, 258 (1958).
7. See PnxcE & BrrNER, EFrEcrivE LEoAL RsEARcH 93-94 (1953), to the

effect that, except for federal district courts, the Court of Claims, the Customs
Court, and those of some lower courts such as in New York or Pennsylvania,
printed reports are of those cases appealed to a higher court, and that relatively
few of the cases heard in lower courts are reported.
8. People v. Osterhelt, 125 Cal. App. 776, 14 P.2d 140 (Dist. Ct. App. 1932);
People v. Miller, 112 Cal. App. 535, 297 Pac. 40 (Dist. Ct. App. 1931); People v.
Jones, 87 Cal. App. 482, 262 Pac. 361 (Dist. Ct. App. 1927).
9. See, e.g., Canard v. State, 283 S.W.2d 685 (Ark. 1955); State v. Mitchell,
77 Idaho 115, 289 P.2d 315 (1953); People ex rel. Barrett v. Bardens, 394 Ill.
511, 68 N.E.2d 710 (1946).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol25/iss2/6
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believes that to consider probation after a trial would offend the sanctity of a
jury's verdict.10
This reasoning may be overcome in part by merely stating that as to the
expense of trial, there is, or can be, a general condition in each grant of probation
that the probationer must, within a stated time, pay his court costs; and as to
"utilizing" the time of the judge and the prosecutor, they have done nothing but
that which they hold their offices to do. But on their face these arguments are
to some degree superficial, and more cogent arguments by way of rebuttal are
evident.
In the first place such an attitude on the part of courts seems to ignore the
language of the statutes on probation. The power of probation is largely statutory;"
if all states do not recognize it as so created, they seemingly recognize it as limited
by statute.12 The court in the principal case points out that the policy as expressed
by the district court contravenes the legislative policy as set forth by the statute.
The Missouri statutes on the question, which in this respect are representative,' 8
are equally clear as to the legislative intent. In the two statutes relating to
municipal court judges, probation is said to be allowable to those "who shall plead
guilty or on trial shall be convicted . . . ."4 Another statute refers to "conviction,"
but in no way restricts the manner of arriving at that stage.15 Missouri Supreme
Court Rule 27.07(b) precludes the use of a probation officer's report "unless the
defendant has pleaded guilty or been found guilty." The intent of the legislature
seems clear, and a policy which says that a defendant who pleads "not guilty" is
not to be considered for probation conflicts with such legislative intent.
The basic objection to the application of such a policy is that it rears before
the defendant the choice of pleading guilty and foregoing his constitutional
right to trial by jury, with possibility of probation as a consideration, or
pleading not guilty, with imprisonment assured if convicted. Perhaps the
placing of such a choice before a defendant might not be greatly criticized
10. See cases cited note 8 supra. See also J'udge Lynne's Soiund Views on Piobation, 17 Ala. Law. 28 (1956).
11. The courts of some states have taken the attitude that they have inherent
power to suspend sentence. E.g., State v. Simmington, 235 N.C. 612, 70 S.E.2d
842 (1952); Varela v. Merrill, 51 Ariz. 64, 74 P.2d 569 (1937); People v. Court of
Sessions, 141 N.Y. 288 (1894). Most courts, however, have denied that they have
such power in the absence of statute. The Supreme Court early took this position
in regard to federal courts. Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27 (1916). In Freeman
v. State, 220 Miss. 777, 72 So. 2d 139 (1954), the Supreme Court of Mississippi held
that the judgment of a county court suspending sentence prior to the act which
extended the probation statute to county courts in 1950, was void. See also, Webster, The Evolution of Probationin A-merican Law, 1 BUFFALO L. REv. 249 (1952).
12. Ex parte Kuney, 5 N.Y.S.2d 644, 168 Misc. 285 (1938), aff'd People
ex rel. Kuney v. Adams, 9 N.Y.S.2d 403, 256 App. Div. 802 (1939), appeal granted
11 N.Y.S.2d 218, 256 App. Div. 921 (1939), aff'd 280 N.Y. 794, 21 N.E.2d 621
(1939).
13. WArrE, THE PREVErION oF REPEATED CRIMES, Appendix A, p. 95 (1943).
14. §§ 74.653, 98.250, RSMo 1949.
15. § 549.OSO, RSMo 1949. Any person convicted of a felony, except certain
felonies, is eligible for "parole."
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if every man knew when he was legally responsible; but such is not the case because this is something no man in our society can positively know. A man may
very well think that he is innocent, or may simply think he can never be convicted,
and desire to test that legal conclusion; a man under our system of justice, and
with our constitutional guarantees, should be allowed to do just that without any
compulsion to deter that desire. To create such a choice is to exercise a species
of judicial coercion, which very conceivably might bring a wavering "guilty" from
the lips of a frustrated defendant. Quite to the contrary of the policy under
consideration, courts, when accepting pleas of guilty, should withhold all indication
that the defendant might be placed on probation. The danger that probation might
be used to bargain a plea of guilty must be guarded against.10 Also it can be said that
the policy, with its coercive effect, does much to overcome the basic presumption
of innocence to which every defendant is entitled.
The basic purpose and theory behind probation is that the public will be the
ultimate beneficiary. 17 The public is benefited by possible reclamation of one of
its citizens. In terms of dollars this means incalculable sums saved because probation costs are less than one-tenth that of institutional care, probationers are wage
earners, can make restitution, pay court costs and taxes, and their families
are not dependent on public assistance or charity.18 Many social values, implicit in
the concept of probation, are apparent; advances in our social thinking by recognition of the validity of the correctional approach to the offender as opposed to
the purely punitive approach; maintenance of the unity of society by holding
families together, and thereby helping to strengthen the concept of the individual's social responsibility; strengthening of the concept of the community's
responsibility to the individual by keeping the offender in the community; conversely, strengthening of the concept of the individual's responsibility to the community by requiring him to function as a citizen and helping him to do so; and
increasing the public's understanding and acceptance of crime as a social problem. 18
If these considerations, all of which obviously make society the rich beneficiary
of a successful probation program, are to be given their due regard, necessarily
each offender must be treated in an individualized way.20 Probation cannot achieve
all its possibilities if the courts categorize, thus allowing procedures to become
rigid and uniform. Therefore it is apparent that establishing a rule that a defendant
who pleads "not guilty" is not to be considered for probation is contrary to the
fundamental purpose and theory of probation.
Probation should depend upon considerations of the defendant's past conduct, his
probable future conduct, and the ends of justice, all to the betterment of the
welfare of society, and not upon whether or not a defendant exercises his consti16. Gentry, Individualized Justice Throug. Probation, 19 Ky. S.B.J. 140, 142
(1955).
17. State v. Moore, 78 Idaho 359, 304 P.2d 1101 (1956); People v. Molz,
415 I1. 183, 113 N.E.2d 314 (1953).
18. Gentry, supra note 16.
19. MacCormick, The Potential Value of Probation, 19 Fed. Prob. 3 (1955).
20. Swygert, Individualized Treatment in Probation,20 Fed. Prob. 18 (1956).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol25/iss2/6
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tutional right to trial by jury. Contrary to this, many courts say, as does the district court in the principal case, that the granting of probation is a matter of grace.
But it should not be; it is a power that should be exercised when, and if, it appears
compatible with public interest.21 If all courts realize this, and adhere to it, there may
never be another case where probation is refused solely because a defendant has
pleaded "not guilty."
DANIEL

H.

COLEMAN

SUIT BY MINOR AGAINST NEGLIGENT PARENT
WiUrtl v. WUrtl.

Plaintiff, a minor, sued her father to recover for personal injuries sustained
in an automobile collision. The collision occurred while the father was driving
the plaintiff to work. The sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a finding of negligence of the father was not controverted. Plaintiff began work at the age of nineteen and had been working one and one-half years before her injury. Generally she
paid all of her own bills while working, including expenses of clothing, medical bills
and room and board (which she paid to her parents). She had paid, or was personally obligated to pay, all the expenses incurred in the treatment of the injuries
she received. There was no evidence offered by the defendant that he paid for any
of her expenses or assumed any of her obligations. The question as to whether
or not the plaintiff was emancipated was submitted to the jury and answered in
the affirmative. The trial judge set aside the verdict for the plaintiff on the
grounds that plaintiff had not been emancipated and an unemancipated minor
could not sue a parent. On appeal, the supreme court set aside the judgment of
the trial court with directions to reinstate the jury verdict.
The English common law said nothing about the matter of a child being able
to sue its parents in tort.2 But causes of action in matters affecting property seem
always to have been freely recognized on the part of either the parent or child.8
21. Williams v. Harris, 106 Utah 387, 149 P.2d 640 (1944).
1. 322 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. 1959) (en banc).
2. SCHOULER, DoMESTic RELATIONS § 267 (3 ed. 1882). In English law, the
term "emancipation" is generally used in reference to matters of parochial settlement and support of paupers. Little is said concerning the emancipation of minor
children by their fathers, because the English municipal system is very different
from our own and, except for custody, gives rise to little controversy.
The doctrine has been maintained that during the minority of the child he
will remain, under most circumstances, unemancipated. In fact, there can be no
emancipation of an infant unless he marries and becomes the head of the family
or contracts some other relation so as to wholly and permanently exclude parental
control. In the case of Rex v. Rotherfield Grays, 1 B.&C. 345, 107 Eng. Rep. 128
(1823), an infant was held not to have been emancipated by his enlistment.
3.

PROSSER, ToRTs § 101 (2d ed. 1955).
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The initial case in the United States involving this problem established the rule
that an unemancipated child cannot sue a parent in tort 4

The reason -most commonly given for denying such an action is that parental
authority and harmonious family relations should be maintained, and to allow
such an action by the child would endanger both. If a situation exists where the
suit will not affect these relations, which is the case when an emancipated child
sues his parents, the reason for the rule fails and it should not be applied.,
Emancipation of a child consists of the relinquishing by the parent of control
and authority over the child and conferring on him the right to his earnings.,
Emancipation is the complete severance of the parent and filial relationship; 7 this
occurs when the child is placed in a new relationship inconsistent with the former
relationship as a part of the parent's family.$ The effect of emancipation is to
give the child the right to his earnings, disposal of his own time, and in a great
measure, the control of his own person. Also it relieves the parents of all legal
obligation to support the minor child.9
Emancipation may be effected by operation of law (a) when there is an
abandonment and renunciation by the parent(s) and his (their) failure to support
the child;10 (b) when a minor enlists in the military service (this emancipation
is effective only so long as the minor is in the military service);11 (c) when a child
attains majority;12 and (d) when a child marries with the consent of the parents.1 3
According to the usual view a child who has married without the consent of his
14
parents is also considered emancipated.
4. Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
5. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 AtI. 905 (1930); Signs v. Signs, 156
Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952).
6. Swenson v. Swenson, 241 Mo. App. 21, 227 S.W.2d 103 (K.C. Ct. App.
1950); Wallace v. Cox, 136 Tenn. 69, 188 S.W. 611 (1916).
7. Swenson v. Swenson, sutpra note 6; Brosius v. Barker, 154 Mo. App. 657,
136 S.W. 18 (Spr. Ct. App. 1911).
8. Wood v. Wood, 135 Conn. 280, 63 A.2d 586 (1948); Town of Plainville
v. Town of Milford, 119 Conn. 380, 177 Atl. 138 (1935); Note, 9 S.C.L.Q. 269
(1957).
9. SCHour.ER, Op. cit. supra note 2, § 268.
10. Inhabitants of Carthage v. Inhabitants of Canton, 97 Me. 473, 477, 54
At. 1104, 1105 (1903). In this case the court, however, specifically stated:
It is undoubtedly true that the mere separation of father and child,
or the mere failure of the former to contribute to the support of the latter,
are not sufficient for the purpose of showing such a voluntary abandonment
and renunciation as are necessary to constitute an emancipation. These conditions may be accounted for by reason of the misfortune or destitution of
the father, without disclosing any intention upon his part to permanently
terminate the parental and filial relations.
11. Iroquois Iron Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 294 Ill. 106, 128 N.E. 289 (1920);
Swenson v. Swenson, supra note 6. The minor puts himself under control of the
government which is a relationship inconsistent with the control and care of the
parent, and thus severs the filial relationship as if he were of age.
12. SCHOULER, op. cit. supra note 2, § 269.
13. Note, 9 S.C.L.Q. 269, 275 (1957).
14. Ibid.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol25/iss2/6
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What constitutes emancipation is a matter of law.1 5 Whether emancipation
exists in a particular case is a question of fact to be decided by a jury, weighing
all the facts and circumstances of each case.16 The burden of proving emancipation is on the person alleging it, whether it be used as the basis of a cause of action
or as a defense;7 there is no presumption of emancipation.1S
Emancipation results from some juristic, or other act, of the parent and not
from any act of the minor.' 9 Emancipation may be effected either by an express
agreement, or may be implied from the facts of a particular case. An express agreement, either oral or written, between the parent and the child to the effect that
the parent surrenders all his rights to the custody, care and earnings of the child
and renounces parental duties will effect an emancipation. When the parent by his
conduct impliedly consents to the relinquishment of the same rights and duties, an
implied emancipation results.20 A partial emancipation occurs when there is something less than a complete surrender of the parental rights to custody, care and
earnings of the child.21 A partial emancipation is an emancipation for certain purposes only, such as a parent releasing his right to the child's earnings, 22 which
would not enable the child to sue his parents.
It is not necessary, that a child leave home, or work away from home, in order
to sever filial ties.&2 The fact that the parents give a minor child room and board
is only one fact to be considered and is not decisive in determining if the filial
relationship has been severed. 24 A parent may authorize his minor child to make
his own contracts of employment, collect and spend the money earned from such
employment, and still not emancipate him from parental custody or control.25 In
most of the cases, waiver by the parent of the right to the child's earnings is not
sufficient in itself for a complete emancipation, but only effects a partial emancipa-

• 15. Evans v. Kansas City Bridge Co., 213 Mo. App. 101, 247 S.W. 213 (K.C.
Ct. App. 1923).
16. Iroquois Iron Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, supra note 11; Brosius v. Barker,
supra note 7.

17. Brosius v. Barker, supra note 7; Parker v. Parker, 94 S.E.2d 12 (S.C.
1956); Wallace v. Cox, 136 Tenn. 69, 188 S.W. 611 (1916).
18. Winebremer v. Eberhardt, 137 Mo. App. 659, 119 S.W. 530 (K.C. Ct.
App. 1909).
19. Detwiler v. Detwiler, 162 Pa. Super. 383, 57 A.2d 426 (1948).
20. Wood v. Wood, supra note 8. The father consented to his minor daughter
undertaking outside employment and surrendered to her absolute control of all
her earnings. The parents continued to furnish her room and board but neither
claimed nor asserted any right to control her activities. The court said these facts
afford strong support for an inference of emancipation.
21. Wood v. Wood, supra note 8; Note, 9 S.C.L.Q. 269, 272 (1957).
22. Coleman v. Dublin Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 47 Ga. App. 369, 170 S.E.

549 (1933).
23. Martinez v. Southern Pac. Co., 45 Cal. 2d 244, 288 P.2d 868 (1955);
Dierker v. Hess, 54 Mo. 246 (1873); Groh v. W. 0. Krahn, Inc., 223 Wisc. 662,

271 N.W. 374 (1937).

24. Wood v. Wood, sup-ra note 8.

25. Lufkin v. Harvey, 131 Minn. 238, 154 N.W. 1097 (1915).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1960
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tion. 2 6 These cases require in addition a complete severance of the filial relations.
Where one of the additional major facts was that the parents neither claimed nor
asserted any right to control the child's activities, there is a strong inference of
emancipation.27
In the principal case, the court seems to conclude that total emancipation was
effected because the plaintiff earned her own living and paid her own expenses.
The court made no mention as to whether the parents claimed or asserted any
right to control her activities. This liberality seems desirable in the light of modern
trends. In today's society, minor children, as a general rule, are not solely supported by their parents until majority even though they reside in the family home.
When a minor has paid all of the expenses arising out of the parent's tort, or is

personally liable for such expenses, he should not have a disability placed upon
him, making it impossible to recover damages in a suit against his parent. On
these facts alone, he should be considered emancipated from his parents. A minor
that is self-supporting is in a position to choose his own residence. The fact that
he chooses to live in his parents home and, therefore, must obey the family regulations should not be the determining fact of his emancipation; he may be obligated
to obey a certain number of regulations regardless of where he choses to establish
his residence. Therefore, it appears that the court properly excluded consideration
of the plaintiff's abode.
MARTHA JANE PETERMAN

TORTS-LACK OF PRIVITY NO DEFENSE TO PERSONS ENGAGED
IN THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW
Biakaja v. Irving'

The defendant, a notary public and accountant, prepared a will for the
decedent in which the plaintiff was the sole beneficiary. As a result of defendant's
negligence the will was not properly attested as required by law,2 and the plaintiff
received only one-eighth of the estate by intestate succession. The plaintiff sued
26. Lufkin v. Harvey, supra note 25; Taubert v. Taubert, 103 Minn. 247, 114
N.W. 763 (1908); Detwiler v. Detwiler, supra note 19.
27. Wood v. Wood, supra note 8. In Detwiler v. Detwiler, supra note 19,
where the parents alleged emancipation of their son, it was held that the parents
did not meet the burden of proof to show total emancipation. The son had been
gainfully employed outside of the family relationship since leaving school at the
age of seventeen but had continued to live in his parent's home, paying them
board. Although the parents never found occasion to do so, he was subject to their
discipline, and this was the basis for the court's holding that the son had not been
totally emancipated. The court stated, 162 Pa. Super. at 386, 57 A.2d at 428:
True, his parents have not found it necessary to exercise control over his
conduct in relation to them, but only because defendant 'is a good boy'
and conforms to the established pattern of the home. Nowhere is there any
evidence from which it could be inferred that he would not have to submit
to discipline from his parents if his conduct were otherwise.
1. 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
2. CAL. ANN. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6125-26 (1954); People v. Sipper, 61
Cal. App. 2d 844, 142 P.2d 960 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1943).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol25/iss2/6
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for damages caused by the defendant's negligence. The district court of appeals, in

affirming judgment for the plaintiff, found that the acts of the unlicensed defendant,
in preparing the will were in violation of a state licensing statutes and constituted

negligence per se.4 On appeal, the supreme court affirmed the result, but on a different theory. The court held that the notary public owed a duty to the plaintiff regardless of lack of privity because he knew that the transaction was intended to

affect directly the plaintiff's interests.
The doctrine that privity of contract is required, for liability arising out of
contractual relations, has long been recognized, 5 and privity was long required for

tort liability which arose out of contractual undertakings. This doctrine in liability
for negligence has been undergoing considerable change where there is damage to a
person or to his property, that is, to tangible interest. The leading case of Mac-

Pherson v. Buick Motor Co. 6 established the now generally accepted doctrine that
a supplier of chattels may be liable to a third person for damage caused by negligence to his person or property whether or not there is privity. Since the MacPlerson case there have been an increasing number of exceptions to the privity

rule. Actually, the exceptions have almost destroyed the privity rule where there
is damage to tangible interests.
The exception to the privity doctrine as established by the MacPherson case
was not applied to persons negligently supplying information or services to guide
others in business transactions. This was generally true in the case of abstracterse

and attorneys.8 An early California case, Buckley v. Gray,9 held that a person named
3. See statute, supra note 2.
4. Biakanja v. Irving, 310 P.2d 63 (Cal. Dist. Ct App. 1957).
5. Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 114-15, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 405
(1842). The court said:
Unless we confine the operation of such contracts as this to the parties
who entered into them, the most absurd and outrageous consequenses, to
which I can see no limit, would ensue. . . . The only safe rule is to confine the right to recover to those who enter into the contract: if we go one
step beyond that, there is no reason why we should not go fifty.
See also Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 120 Fed. 865 (8th Cir. 1903);
2 HARPER & JAMEs, TORTs § 18.5 (1956).
6. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). See PRossER, ToRTs §§ 84-85 (2d ed.
1955).

7. Abstract & Title Guarantee Co. v. Kigin, 21 Ala. App. 397, 108 So. 626

(1926); Talpey v. Wright, 61 Ark. 275, 32 S.W. 1072 (1895); Mitchell v. Cali-

fornia-Pacific Title Ins. Co., 79 Cal. App. 45, 248 Pac. 1035 (Dist. Ct. App. 1926);
Schade v. Gehner, 133 Mo. 252, 34 S.W. 576 (1896) (liability of examiner of title);

Zweigardt v. Birdseye, 57 Mo. App. 462 (K.C. Ct. App. 1894); Equitable Bldg.
& Loan Ass'n v. Bank of Commerce & Trust Co., 118 Tenn. 678, 102 S.W. 901
(1907). Contra, Brown v. Sims, 22 Ind. App. 317, 53 N.E. 779 (1899); Gate City

Abstract Co. v. Post, 55 Neb. 742, 76 N.W. 471 (1890); Dickle v. Nashville Ab-

stract Co., 89 Tenn. 431, 14 S.W. 896 (1890). See also Annots., 68 A.L.R. 375
(1930), 34 A.L.R. 67 (1925).
8. Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1879); Jacobsen v. Overseas Tankship Corp., 11 F.R.D. 97 (E.O.N.Y. 1950); Buckley v. Gray, 110 Cal. 339, 42 Pac.
900 (1895); Kendall v. Rogers, 31 A.2d 312 (Md. Sup. Ct. 1943) (liability of attorney in passing on validity of title to land is founded on contract and not on tort).
See also Annots., 45 A.L.R.2d 5 (1956), 5 A.L.R. 1389 (1920).
9. 110 Cal. 339, 42 Pac. 900 (1895).
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as a beneficiary could not recover damages from an attorney who owed no duty to
the beneficiary. In Mickel v. Mirphy, -0 on facts similar to the principal case, it was
held that a notary public owed a duty only to his client and was not liable to a
third person who was beneficiary of a will.
Recovery has been allowed in some cases where the parties were not in privity
and -there was damage to intangible interests. Generally, the result reached in
these cases has followed the supplier of chattel cases instead of the cases involving
abstracters or attorneys. The case of Glanzer v. Shepard,11 was strongly relied on
in the principal case. In that case a purchaser of beans overpaid the vendor in
reliance on an erroneous certificate prepared by a public weigher who was employed by the vendor. One copy of the certificate was sent to the vendor and a
duplicate copy to the vendee. In holding the weigher liable to the vendee, the
court stated that the weigher's use of the certificate was, to the weigher's knowledge, the "end and aim" of the transaction. "Diligence was owing, not only to him
that ordered, but also to him that relied."1 2
The doctrine in the Glanzer case was limited to some extent in the later case
of Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co.,2 3 where recovery was denied to third
persons who had advanced money to a company because of negligently prepared
accounting statements by public accountants. One of the main arguments for denying recovery was the possibility of unlimited liability to an unknown class of persons. This has been one of the paramount reasons for the requirement of privity.14
In view of the extent to which liability has been extended in the tangible interest
cases,1 5 it appears that this reason can be no longer logically applied to the intangible interest problem. By the use of insurance, liability to a third person for
injury to his intangible interests can be protected against as in the case of tangible
interests. In the instant case the extent of injury was reasonably certain, depending
upon any subsequent increases or decreases in the testator's estate.
Obviously, recovery should not be allowed in every case to a person disappointed in the failure of a contract to which he is not a party. To hold the weigher
liable in the Glanzer case the test was, "did the weigher know that the certificate
was the 'end and aim' of the transaction between the vendor and the vendee." In
the principal case the duty to a third person is found by the balancing of various
factors which include the extent the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the certainty that the plaintiff suffered
injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the
injury, and the policy of preventing future harm.
10. 305 P.2d 993 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957); Howard, Unauthorized Practice
of Law-Attorneys-Duty Owed Others Than Client to Use Care in Performing
Functions of an Attorney, 23 Mo. L. REv. 108 (1958).
11. 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922) (Cardozo, J.).
12. 233 N.Y. at 242, 135 N.E. at 277.
13. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
14. See note 6 supra.
15. E.g., Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 166 F.2d 908 (3d Cir.
1948); Foley v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Co., 363 Pa. 1, 68 A.2d 517 (1949).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol25/iss2/6
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There seems to be a strong trend in favor of holding a person liable where he
negligently supplies information or services which cause harm to a third person's
financial interests. The Restatement of Torts"6 states that a person who negligently
supplies information in the course of his business or profession, to guide another in
a business transaction, may be held liable regardless of privity. Also, many states
have statutes making abstracters liable for damage arising out of the abstracter's
negligence.
No one other than the beneficiary could sue for the harm caused by the defendant's negligence because he caused no damage to anyone else. Also, the fact
that the notary in the principal case could be charged with a misdemeanor is no
redress to the beneficiary. The court, by allowing the beneficiary to sue in tort,
granted what appears to be the only just remedy. It seems that by using the various
factors set out in the Biakanqa case as a test, the courts can move with safety to
protect some of the more obvious intangible interests of third parties. The principal
case has taken a new approach to problems in an area long overdue for revision
in holding that a person engaged in the unauthorized practice of law may be held
liable in tort to one with whom he is not in privity; this is both just to those
harmed by such negligence and a strong deterrent to the unauthorized practice of
law.
A subsequent California casei 7 states that the Buckley case was overruled by
the principal case. Since the Buckley case involved the liability of an attorney to .
a third party in the drafting of a will, then quaere, is the principal case broad
enough to apply to attorney?
BYRoN KENT SNAPP

TORTS-MISSOURI-INVASION OF PRIVACYORAL COMMUNICATIONS
Biederman's of Springfield, Inc. v. Wright'
Plaintiff brought this action for the balance due on account for merchandise
purchased by defendants. Defendants filed separate counterclaims because of the
allegedly tortious conduct of plaintiff's agent in attempting to collect the account.
Defendant-wife's counterclaim alleged that an agent of plaintiff went to the cafe
in which defendant-wife worked as a waitress on three separate occasions and followed her around the restaurant stating in a loud voice that she and her husband
had refused to pay their bill, that they were deadbeats and did not intend to pay
for their furniture when they got it, and that he intended to get both of them fired
from their jobs. The circuit court sustained plaintiff's motion to dismiss the counter-

16. §552 (1938).

17. Johnson v. Holmes Tutle Lincoln-Mercury, 160 Cal. App. 2d 290, 325 P.2d
193 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958).

1. 322 S.W.2d 892 (Mo. 1959).
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claims on the ground that such pleadings failed to state claims upon which relief

could be granted. On appeal from this judgment, held, reversed and remanded.
The Supreme Court held that merely because the counterclaims were based on oral
communications did not make them insufficient as a matter of law.2
The law respecting the right of privacy is relatively modern, having first been
asserted in 1890.3 Although earlier cases had involved what we would today call

a right of privacy, the decisions were based on some historically recognized ground,
such as a right of property,4 a breach of trust,5 or implied contract.0 The leading
case of Prince Albert v. Strange7 stressed the idea that the unauthorized publication of etchings made by the Queen and Prince Albert for their private amusement
amounted to an invasion of their privacy; but the court based its decision granting
injunctive relief on property rights and breach of trust.
The first American case to recognize a right of privacy as such was Pavesich v.
New England Life Ins. Co." Although two other jurisdictions had previously held
that the right did not exist,9 the court said:
[A] violation of the right of privacy is a direct invasion of a legal right
of the individual. 10
Missouri recognized the doctrine as early as 1911,11 although the court classified
the right of privacy as a property right, 2 The Missouri Supreme Court, in a later
case, Barber v. Time,'" however, relying on an article by Dean Green,' 4 based the
right of privacy on an "'appropriation of an interest in personality.' "15 The Missouri
Supreme Court has recently cited with approval the Barber case.' 0
Some courts have held that a creditor has a right to take reasonable action
to obtain payment from his debtor although the action taken may result in some
invasion of the debtor's right of privacy. If a creditor were not allowed this reasonable action, he may be induced to proceed with legal action without first
2. Id. at 897.
3. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HA,v. L. REv. 193 (1890).
4. E.g., Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swans. 402, 36 Eng. Rep. 670 (Ch. 1818), where
an injunction was granted to restrain the publication of a private letter on the
grounds that the writer had a property right in the letter, and it would be a breach
of trust to publish it.
5. E.g., Folsom v. Marsh, 9 Fed. Cas. 342 (No. 4901) (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
6. E.g., Pollard v. Photographic Co., 58 L.J. Ch. 251 (1889).
7. 2 De G. & Sm. 652, 64 Eng. Rep. 293, aff'd, 1 Mac. & G. 25, 41 Eng. Rep.
1171 (Ch. 1849).
8. 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
9. Atkinson v. John E. Doherty & Co., 121 Mich. 372, 80 N.W. 285 (1899);
Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902).
10. 122 Ga. at 201-02, 50 S.E. at 73.
11. Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S.W. 1076 (K.C. Ct. App. 1911).
12. Id. at 658-60, 134 S.W. at 1078-79.
13. 358 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942).
14. Green, The Right of Privacy, 27 ILL. L. Rnv. 237 (1932).
15. 348 Mo. at 1205, 159 S.W.2d at 294.
16. State v. Nolan, 316 S.W.2d 630, 634 (Mo. 1958). Here, in a criminal case,
the accused contended that the Habitual Criminal Act, by invading the right of
privacy, was unconstitutional. The court disallowed the contention, but, citing
Barber v. Time, reaffirmed the existence of the right of privacy in Missouri.
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warning the debtor, rather than risk being sued for an invasion of the debtor's
right of privacy.17 With today's increasingly large number of credit transactions,
one can imagine the torrent of litigation in our courts if each creditor pursued legal
action to collect his debts.
Debt collections have been held not to invade the right of privacy where the
creditor sent letters to the debtor's employer.18 Other attempts to collect debts by
friendly garnishment have been held to invade the right of privacy. 9 Attempts
to collect debts have been held actionable on grounds other than an invasion of the
right of privacy, such as intentionally produced mental distress, 20 or libel. 21
When the doctrine of right of privacy was first developed it was advocated
that it should be limited so as not to allow recovery for oral invasion unless there
were special damages shown.22 On the basis of the "trifling" injuries caused by
oral communications, Warren and Brandeis said: "The same reasons exist for distinguishing between oral and written publications of private matters, as is afforded
in the law of defamation by the restricted liability for slander as compared with
the liability for libel." 23 But the reason for such distinction in defamation should
not apply to the law of the right of privacy. The right to freedom from defamation
concerns one's reputation, whereas the right of privacy concerns one's peace of
mind. 24 It would be as injurious to one's peace of mind to have his innermost
17. Davis v. General Fin. & Thrift Corp., 80 Ga. App. 708, 711, 57 S.E.2d
225, 227 (1950).
18. Gouldman-Taber Pontiac, Inc. v. Zerbst, 96 Ga. App. 48, 99 S.E.2d 475,
rev'd 100 S.E.2d 881 (1957); Patton v. Jacobs, 118 Ind. App. 358, 78 N.E.2d 789
(1948); Lucas v. Moskin's Stores, 262 S.W.2d 679 (Ky. 1953); Hawley v. Professional Credit Bureau, 345 Mich. 500, 76 N.W.2d 835 (1956). See also McKinzie
v. Huckaby, 112 F. Supp. 642 (W.D. Okla. 1953) (creditor had an armed policeman
accompany him to debtor's home); Davis v. General Fin. & Thrift Corp., supra,
note 17 (creditor sent telegram to debtor, threatening legal action); Lewis v.
Physicians & Dentists Credit Bureau, 27 Wash. 2d 267, 177 P.2d 896 (1947) (creditor phoned debtor's employer, threatening to garnishee his wages); Judevine v.
Benzies-Montanye Fuel & Warehouse Co., 222 Wis. 512, 269 N.W. 295 (1936)
(creditor distributed handbills throughout the city, advertising plaintiff's debt; but
the court further declared that the right of privacy is not actionable in Wisconsin).
19. Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927) (creditor placed large
sign in store window advertising plaintiff's debt); Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35,
133 N.E.2d 340 (1956) (creditor harrassingly called debtor's residence at late
hours); Trammell v. Citizens News Co., 285 Ky. 529, 148 S.W.2d 708 (1941)
(creditor published advertisement of plaintiff's debt in newspaper). But see Zier
v. Hoflin, 33 Minn. 66, 21 N.W. 862 (1885) (recovery based on libel).
20. Bowden v. Spiegel, 96 Cal. App. 2d 793, 216 P.2d 571 (Dist. Ct. App. 1950);
Barnett v. Collection Serv. Co., 214 Iowa 1303, 242 N.W. 25 (1932); La Salle Extension Univ. v. Fogarty, 126 Neb. 457, 253 N.W. 424 (1934); Davidson v. Lee,
139 S.W. 904 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911).
21. Thompson v. Adelberg & Berman, Inc., 181 Ky. 487, 205 S.W. 558 (1918);
McClain v. Reliance Life Ins. Co., 150 S.C. 459, 148 S.E. 478 (1929); Muetze v.
Tuteur, 77 Wis. 236, 46 N.W. 123 (1890). But see Quina v. Roberts, 16 So. 2d 558
(La. App. 1944).
22. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3, at 217.
23. Id. at 217.
24. Themo v. New Eng. Newspaper Pub. Co., 306 Mass. 54, 27 N.E.2d 753
(1940).
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secrets opened to the public by an oral communication as by a written one.
Granted, that if the interest were that of reputation, a written communication
would generally be more devastating. But to violate one's right to seclusion and
privacy by unwarranted and undesired publicity by spoken words may so unveil
the plaintiff's private affairs that it would be an injustice to deny him recovery
on the grounds that his life was opened to the public by word of mouth rather
than the printed page. In recent years a right of action for an invasion of the right
of privacy by means of an oral communication has been allowed in a few jurisdictions.2 5 "The oral dissemination of private matter may be as rapid as the wagging tongue of gossip and as devastating as the printed page....1-2o
Most courts that have refused redress for invasion of privacy by oral communications have relied on Warren and Brandeis' limitation that there shall be no
recovery "in the- absence of special damage,"27 and seem to accept it without
qualification. These courts have dogmatically stated that they will not recognize
a cause of action for invasion of the right of privacy by an oral communication. 28
The principal case has also followed Warren and Brandeis, but has recognized the
inherent qualification in their limitation; the Biedermn case has allowed such
redress if the oral communication caused special damages. The court said that
there is an insufficient basis for reasoning that there can be no recovery for an
invasion of the right of privacy by an oral communication. ". . . [T~he oral publication [here] would seem to be more productive of emotional distress and widespread and lasting damage than a written communication."12 The supreme court
has desirably interpreted the basic rule of Warren and Brandeis regarding oral
communications invading the right of privacy, apparently protecting the debtor in
Missouri from harrassment, unwarranted publicity and ridicule by an over-anxious
creditor.
RICHARD

H.

BRIINER

TORTS-MISSOURI-MANUFACTURER'S LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENT
FAILURE TO WARN OF DANGEROUS PRODUCTS
Haberly v. Reardon Co.1
A small boy, while helping his father paint bricks, was blinded in one eye
within minutes after his eye came into contact with paint on a brush held by his
father. The boy was removing debris from around the bricks while the actual
painting was being done by the father. In response to the father's request to clear
25. Bowden v. Spiegel, supra note 20 (dictum) (telephone calls); Housh v.
Peth, snpra note 19 (telephone calls).
26. Bowden v. Spiegel, supra note 20, at 796, 216 P.2d at 573.
27. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3, at 217.
28. See, e.g., Brents v. Morgan, supra note 19.
29. 322 S.W.2d at 897.
1. 319 S.W.2d 859, 861 (Mo. 1958) (en banc) (Storckman, Leedy, and Hyde,
JJ., dissenting).
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away some leaves he had missed, the boy moved from a kneeling position to a
position nearer his father and in so doing ran into the paint brush. The following
warning appeared on the box containing the paint:
'Caution: Inasmuch as the alkalinity of... [this paint] may be irritating
to tender or sensitive skin, it is advisable to use a paddle for mixing, and
to avoid excessive or prolonged contact with the skin. Portland cement47%; calcium oxide (hydrated) 44%-aluminum silicate, 4%-tinting materials, sealer and curing agents, total less than 5%.'
The son, for his personal injuries, and the father, for expenses incurred and loss
of his son's companionship, brought separate actions against the paint manufacturer based on negligence. The trial court joined the two actions. The alleged
negligence was the inadequacy of the warning contained on the paint box inasmuch
as calcium oxide is highly caustic lime, a fact that is not common knowledge nor
was it known by either of the plaintiffs. In the trial court there was a verdict for
the plaintiffs and judgment was entered for $15,400. On appeal, hed, affirmed.
Negligence in the area of products liability generally arises from (1) defective
construction, (2) mislabeling, (3) negligent inspection or (4) the category into
2
which the instant case falls, negligent failure to warn.
Missouri courts have long adhered to the doctrine that a manufacturer or
other supplier has a duty to warn adequately of dangers in its products which the
user would not normally discover. The reasoning employed in some of the earlier
3
cases has not always led to the same result as that reached in the principal case;
however, the more recent cases indicate that Missouri has joined the mainstream
of decisions in other states. 4
2. Lambert, Personal Inury (Tort) Law, 23 NACCA L.J. 29, 31-32 (1959).
3. The court in McClaren v. Robbins, 349 Mo. 653, 162 S.W.2d 856 (1942),
held that a warning that a manufacturer placed on cans of carbon tetrachloride was
adequate as a matter of law if it was the same type warning used by other manufacturers. Heizer v. Kingsland & Douglass Mfg. Co., 110 Mo. 605, 19 S.W. 630
(1892), held that a defectively constructed cylinder which revolved at high speeds
was not inherently dangerous. In Dempsey v. Virginia Dare Stores, Inc., 239 Mo.
App. 355, 186 S.W.2d 217 (K.C. Ct. App. 1945), a fuzzy textured housecoat was
held to carry its own inflammable warning to the reasonably alert user as a matter of law, but if its dangers were hidden there was no evidence to show that the
supplier-retailer knew of such dangers. Lawson v. Benjamin Ansehl Co., 180 S.W.2d
751 (Spr. Ct. App. 1944), held that although fingernail polish remover carried no
warning as to its inflammability it was not dangerous if used for the intended purpose. Quaere as to its use by women who smoke while painting their fingernails.
4. In Orr v. Shell Oil Co., 352 Mo. 288, 294, 177 S.W.2d 608, 612 (1943), the
court stated:
The rule is now well settled that a duty is imposed upon the one who
furnishes an article which he knows, or ought to know, to be peculiarly dangerous to give notice of its character or bear the natural consequences of
The rule has been extended to cover articles not
his failure to do so ....
only inherently dangerous in their nature, but dangerous because of the use
to which they are to be put by whoever may use them for the purpose
intended. The danger is none the less inherent because it is brought into
action by some external force.
See Braun v. Roux Distrib. Co., 312 S.W.2d 758 (Mo. 1958); Worley v. Procter &
Gamble Mfg. Co., 253 S.W.2d 532 (St. L. Ct. App. 1952). See also PRossER, TORTS
§§ 83-84 (1941); RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 388-90, 394 (1934).
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In the instant case the court rejected the defendant's contention that the
warning on the paint box was adequate as a matter of law and stressed that the
adequacy of such warning was for the determination of the jury. This seems to be
in line with the Missouri decisions. 5 Although the paint box carried a warning of
sorts, its effectiveness to alert a user to the dangers of the paint is highly questionable. In fact, the intimation that the paint might be irritating only to tender
skins and only excessive contact should be avoided would have a tendency to allay
any fears that the user might have and induce him to use less care than he might
have used had no warning at all been given.6
Defendant's argument that the father, a truck driver, should have known that
the paint contained lime, because the description of the contents included Portland
cement and calcium oxide, was weakened considerably by the testimony of defendant's own executive vice-president that he had learned only two weeks before
the trial that calcium oxide was lime.
The court also gave little weight to defendant's arguments that it could not
foresee that the paint would be lodged in plaintiff's eye in such a manner. The
court pointed out that defendant need not have foreseen the exact manner in which
the injury occurred, but rather should have anticipated and warned against the
hazard of paint lodging in the eye by some accidental means.7
As an added element to support its argument that the manner of injury was
not foreseeable, defendant contended that the boy's sudden movement and the way
5. Braun v. Roux Distrib. Co., swspra note 4; Spurlock v. Union Fin. Co., 363
Mo. 62, 248 S.W.2d 578 (1952); Winkler v. Macon Gas Co., 361 Mo. 1017, 238
S.W.2d 386 (1951); Orr v. Shell Oil Co., supra note 4. Contra, McClaren v. Robbins, s1pra note 3, and Dempsey v. Virginia Dare Stores, Inc., supra note 3, both
of which were rejected in Marcus v. Specific Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 82 N.Y.S.2d 194
(1948) and Maize v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 352 Pa. 51, 41 A.2d 850 (1945).
6. In Crist v. Art Metal Works, 230 App. Div. 114, 117, 243 N.Y. Supp. 496,
499 (1930), the court stated:
Underlying the manufacturer's liability is the danger reasonably to be foreseen from the intended use of the article. The advertising matter accompanying it may induce the use in such manner as to make an otherwise
harmless article a source of danger.
Although the paint involved in the principal case could not, by any means, be
classified as harmless, the statement of the New York court would seem applicable
to the Haberly case inasmuch as the advertising might make a dangerous product
even more dangerous.
7. McLeod v. Linde Air Products Co., 318 Mo. 397, 1 S.W.2d 122 (1927) held
that neither the exact manner in which the injury occurred nor the very injury
must be foreseen by defendant for it to be liable, so long as defendant's negligence
was the cause of the injury, and that the supplied chattel need not be inherently
dangerous so long as it became so when applied to its intended use. See Dean v.
Kansas City, St. L. & C., 199 Mo. 386, 97 S.W. 910 (1906). See also Note, 25 IowA
L. Rav. 173, 175 (1939) wherein it is stated:
But since reasonable men may differ as to whether an injury was within
the area of foreseeable danger, dependent on personal knowledge and experience, the question is normally and properly, as here, left to the determination of the jury.
Missouri law would not seem to require that the exact injury be anticipated. Note,
1950 WASH. U.L.Q. 85 (Winter, 1950).
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the father held the brush constituted an intervening force which was not foreseeable and could not have been prevented by a warning. The court refuted this
argument by pointing out that had an adequate warning been given it is likely
that the father and son would have used more caution. A similar line of reasoning
was used in Winkler v. Macon Gas Co.,8 in which the Missouri Supreme Court
stated:
It is possible to be forewarned and have some knowledge and yet it does
not follow as a matter of course that one's appreciation of the danger is or
necessarily must be such that he is contributorily negligent as a matter of
law if he proceeds to act as an ordinary prudent person would in the light
of the knowledge and warning. 9
The decision in the principal case seems to be both logical and in the public
interest inasmuch as it may induce manufacturers to warn of the dangers of their
products in writing of comparable size and lucidity to that of the writing extolling
the virtues of their goods. 10 Although the Haberly case was decided under the
substantive law of New York, the case may serve as persuasive authority for future
decisions of Missouri courts.
GILBERT DALE STEPHENsoN

8. 361 Mo. 1017, 238 S.W.2d 386 (1951).
9. Id. at 1024, 238 S.W.2d at 390. In Wright v. Carter Products, 244
F.2d 53, 60-61 (2d Cir. 1957), plaintiff was injured as a result of using defendant's
"Arrid" and the court declared:
'Though these time-honored defenses (contributory negligence and assumption of risk) are frequently invoked to defeat recovery, they are theoretically inapplicable when the defendant's breach of duty is based on a failure
to warn. To allow these defenses is to indulge in circular reasoning, since
usually the plaintiff cannot be said to have assumed a risk of which he was
ignorant or to have contributed to his own injury when he had no way of
reasonably ascertaining that the danger of injury existed.'
See also Tampa Drug Co. v. Wait, 103 So. 2d 603, 609 (Fla. 1958), in which plaintiff was injured while using carbon tetrachloride on which defendant had placed an
inadequate warning. The court stated:
Implicit in the duty to warn is the duty to warn with a degree of intensity
that would cause a reasonable man to exercise for his own safety the caution commensurate with the potential danger. It is the failure to exercise
such a degree of caution after proper warning that constitutes contributory
negligence in a case such as this.
Cf. Harrison v. Kansas City Elec. Light Co., 195 Mo. 606, 93 S.W. 951 (1906).
10. Maize v. Atlantic Ref. Co., s4ra note 5.
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